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Assessing State Jurisdiction and Industry Regulation over Private Maritime Security 
An international and comparative regulatory review 




The next twenty years will see maritime traffic increase by fifty-percent while world navies 
shrink by thirty-percent.
2
 There is no indication that threats to the global shipping industry will 
disappear, or decrease proportionally. Conversely, seaborne threats appear to be multiplying in 
High Risk Areas (HRAs) around the world. 
3
 
This drop in military naval deployment, combined with spikes in attacks against commercial 
vessels over the last decade, caused shipping companies and other maritime industry 
stakeholders to seek alternative responses for securing global sea lines of communication and 
ensuring uninterrupted maritime supply chain resilience.
4
 The industry has turned to the 
services of Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) to augment their security posture 
and protect assets in high risk areas.
5
 
Privatization of security is a phenomenon of increasing importance in international security 
affairs, especially in the maritime sector. This is distinguished from the use of security 
contractors by the United States, Britain, and other nations in support of wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan where private security companies were hired by sovereign governments and their 
operations took place within countries’ physical borders. Private Maritime Security Companies 
(PMSCs), in contrast, are being solicited by other private companies, namely shipping 
companies, to protect their assets in high-risk maritime zones, including and especially in 
Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (ABNJ.)  
The International Chamber of Shipping representing 80% of world tonnage, numerous national 
shipowning associations, various insurance companies and organizations, and since 2011, even 
                                                        
1 Simon O. Williams is a Master of Laws (LL.M) candidate at the Arctic University of Norway, University of Tromsø’s K.G. 
Jebsen Centre for the Law of the Sea. This document is submitted to satisfy LL.M thesis requirements. August 2014. 
2 Cook, Peter, Head of the Security Association for the Maritime Industry  via 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/rise-private-maritime-security-companies (Accessed 21 August 2014). 
3 UNOSAT Global Report on Maritime Piracy a Geospatial Analysis 1995-2013, p. 26 International Group of P&I Clubs, 
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the IMO have all accepted the industry’s move toward privately contracted armed maritime 
security.
6
 This demonstrates a reversal in IMO policy stance worldwide regarding private 
security and the carriage of weapons for self defense aboard commercial vessels. 
At the state level, some countries have also agreed to allow the provision of Privately 
Contracted Armed Security personnel (PCASP) aboard their flagged vessels following their 
ship-owners’ overwhelming transportation ministries with requests for military vessel 
protection details (VPDs- embarked marines or soldiers on a commercial vessel to protect it 
from piracy or other threats) and if unable to receive such, threatening to move their fleets 
under other more permissive flags [of convenience.] 
At the same time that the global maritime community sought permission for PCASP use, 
PCASP providers have been seeking to distinguish themselves as maritime professionals. 
Surprisingly, the biggest pushes for regulation have not come from government, but actually 
from within this industry sub-sector. The maritime security industry has proactively created 
standards and best management practices for itself, preempting government involvement. 
These standards, have even helped shape government and international regulatory policies 
toward use of PCASP. Professional associations have also sprung up as organizations to 
advance professionalism and influence policy in this sector. 
This paper will examine the evolving role of PMSCs, specifically state jurisdiction over their 
activities in international law as well as explain the myriad of soft law and industry-led 
regulations which have emerged in the maritime security sector. It will begin by depicting the 
private maritime security evolution against the backdrop of the modern maritime industry’s 
development. It will go on to evaluate the main framework-setting instruments, as legal 
sources, for private maritime security activities in international law, namely UNCLOS (zones, 
jurisdiction, innocent passage), SUA, SOLAS, UN Firearms Protocol, as well as the Principle 
of  Self Defense and the Doctrine of Necessity.  
This section will also touch on the challenges related to evaluating provision of armed guards 
aboard a merchant ship as contrary to innocent passage and/or the need for giving prior 
notification, as argued for by some coastal states. Although lightly discussed, this paper will 
                                                        
6 Private Security: Market Responses to Piracy, Terrorism, and Waterborne Security Risks in the 21st Century, Introduction by 
Editors p. 5. 
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not delve into academic debate regarding the definition and classification of piracy, as that 
subject has been widely studied in academic and operational circles and deemed not fitting the 
scope of this paper which seeks to explore regulation of security responses to piracy, not of 
piracy itself. 
The paper will go on to explain market responses to the maritime security industry boom, 
namely the emergence of soft law, industry-led regulations, codes of conduct, and certification 
schemes designed to add order, oversight, and accountability to this industry, closing the 
governance gaps left open in hard-law frameworks. Such examples will be International 
Maritime Organization Circulars, the Montreux Document, the International Code of Conduct 
for Private Security Providers (ICoC), and ISO/PAS 28007. The paper will conclude with a 
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2. Historical Background 
Before countries had the industrial and technological capacity to create and maintain ocean 
going navies, privateers dominated security and private contract combat at sea. As major 
ocean-going countries developed their armed forces, they phased out privateering in order to 
ensure monopoly over armed conflict,
7
 and therefore state power.
8
 
The last century continued this trend, bringing with it two parallel maritime developments; 
legal and technological. At the same time as the codification of the law of the sea and law of 
armed conflict progressed, technological developments swept across commercial marine and 
naval sectors. 
9
  In tandem, these developments changed the face of maritime and specifically 
maritime security, affairs forevermore.  
These changes brought the introduction of modern warships, advanced mining systems, 
submarines, and most importantly- naval aviation. Simultaneously, advancements in law led to 
increased regulation of ocean spaces, both for merchant and military activities taking place in 
maritime environments. 
Today, however, we are at another turning point in maritime security affairs. As state budgets 
are declining and demands on world navies are placing them in increasingly precarious 
positions, we witness the maritime community take private measures to enhance their own 
protection against asymmetric threats, thus liberating our naval forces to defend our freedoms 
on the high seas.
10
 
Accordingly, the maritime industry’s self-help measures can be considered a resurgence, or 
even renaissance, of private maritime security. This time, however, not ungoverned as in the 
                                                        
7 Carafano, James Jay, “The United States’ use of maritime private security from the War of Independence to the 21st 
Century,” Private Security: Market Responses to Piracy, Terrorism, and Waterborne Security Risks in the 21st Century, p. 13. 
8 Weber, Max, from a speech 1918, printed in Politik als Beruf (Politics as a Vocation) by Duncker & Humblodt in 1919, 
available online: https://www.d.umn.edu/~bmork/2111/readings/weberpoliticsasavocation.htm (Accessed: 02 August 2014). 
9 Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols via ICRC, Available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp (Accessed: 28 August 2014). 
10 McKnight, Terence, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.), Private Security: Market Responses to Piracy, Terrorism, and Waterborne 
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unruly pre-industrialization period, but full of legal and industry compliance challenges in the 
post-United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), paradigm. 
Non-state actors entered the maritime scene with a bang. Literally. The western world first 
shifted focus to maritime threats in the year 2000 with the USS Cole bombing in Yemen. This 
was followed by increased maritime counter-terrorism and naval force protection operations, 
mimicked in the commercial world with the adoption of International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS) Code (of SOLAS) coming into effect in 2004, and seeing many countries join 
as signatories. 
On the heels of maritime terrorism came the biggest threat to the physical security of maritime 
trade; piracy/armed robbery at sea. 
Between 2002 and 2005 terrorist attacks and armed robbery spiked in the Malacca Straits. This 
caused the first private maritime security boom. Just after, in 2008, East African piracy surged, 
notably around Somalia (Gulf of Aden region).
11
 This operating area, extending well into the 
Red Sea and Indian Ocean region is much larger than the Mallaca Straits. The shipping 
industry continued to suffer loss from hijacking, stolen cargo, and ransom despite the 
redirection of world naval powers to combat the pirate infestation in the region. The United 
Nations Security Council passed five separate directives aimed at authorizing member navies 
to patrol the waters off the Somali coast and apprehend pirates, whether on the high seas or in 
Somali territorial waters (including on Somali beaches.)”
12
 Now, additional piracy and armed 
robbery hotspots have emerged in the Gulf of Guinea region, leaving regional coastal states, 
global players, and non-state actors scrambling to implement security responses and the legal 
framework necessary to control it. 
The spike in Somali attacks since 2008 and West African attacks in since 2013 forced ship 
owners and charterers to find alternative ways to mitigate risk and avoid, if possible, increasing 
“exception” insurance premiums for routes like the Gulf of Aden and West African coast.
13
 
The ‘threat :: response’ ratio of sending multimillion dollar warships to stop a few pirates in 
                                                        
11 Bateman, Sam, “Maritime security and port state control in the Indian Ocean Region,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 
Volume 8, Number 2, p. 188. 
12  Martin, Jennifer, “Fighting Piracy With Private Security Measures: When Contract Law Should Tell Parties to Walk the 
Plank,” American University Law Review, Volume 59, Issue 5, Article 5, 2010, p. 1366. 
13 Isenberg, David, “The Rise of Private Maritime Security Companies,” Somalia Report, 2008, available at 
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outboard skiffs, simply did not add up; the response was not congruent to the threat and world 
naval powers are finding it difficult to maintain these costs and efforts.
14
 
On-board security emerged as the best, most cost-effective mitigation strategy. Thus the PMSC 
industry received a steroid treatment following the boom in post-2008 Somali piracy, being 
called in to supplement, if not virtually replace, a reliance on naval protection.  
Security at sea revolves around the protection of infrastructure that is mainly owned and 
operated by commercial entities of the private sector. Securing these globally dispersed and 
heavily interconnected supply chains, such as ships and offshore oil-and-gas infrastructure that 
rely on the maritime domain for transport and extraction can best be done by utilizing private 
sector assets- specifically, private security.
15
 
To demonstrate the vitality of private maritime security to the shipping sector some statistics 
will be given below, elucidating figures and supporting the need for research, specifically 
legal, into this booming industry. 
In 2009, 10% of vessels transiting the Horn of Africa/Indian Ocean had private armed guards 
on board.
 16
 In 2010 that number jumped to 27%, and today it is suspected to be around 40% 
worldwide.
17
  Regarding cost, Chinese shipping giant COSCO says it pays 12 million USD per 
year for British PCASP services aboard its 80 vessel fleet.
18
 
Further financial analysis from numbers released by the Independent Maritime Security 
Association, highlights the cost of hiring a private armed security team at about $50,000 per 
transit.
19
 If only 25% of vessels in the Gulf of Aden region employed guards, the math would 
work out to 10,612 transits per year.
20
 At the 25% range that equates to $530.6 million per year 
for private maritime security in the Gulf of Aden region alone.
21
 At 50% it would be a billion 
dollar per year business. Current calculations actually appear to surpass this estimate.
22
 
                                                        
14 (Note: Costs minimum of USD 50,000 per day to operate a small frigate). 
15 Carafano op. cit., p. 23. 
16 UNOSAT Global Report on Maritime Piracy, op. cit. 
17 Kraska, James, “International and Comparative Regulation of Private Maritime Security Companies Employed in Counter-
Piracy” as featured in: Modern Piracy- Legal Challenges and Responses, ed. Douglas Guilfoyle, 2013, Chapter 10, p. 241. 
18 Private Security: Market Responses, op. cit., p. 6. 
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Although the private security sector is largely populated by former military, law enforcement 
and other trained professionals who must meet the stringent vetting criteria of shipping 
companies and are aware of Rules for the Use of Force, the possibility for accidents to occur 
with grave legal consequences remains. Major concerns for ship-owners, masters, and insurers 
include accidental misfires, wrongful murder of fishermen,
23
 ship arrest due to unlicensed 
weapons carriage,
24
 and inability to adjudicate or gather evidence in the occasion that a 
security response incident has gone awry.
25
 
It is frequently argued that the proliferation of maritime security providers  has created an 
operational legal gray zone and PCASP thus work in regulation-free vacuum, both because 
regulations in this sector are thought to not always exist, and because they are on the high seas, 
an Area Beyond National Jurisdiction, which many believe lack’s effective state control. Thus 
there is a mounting public, government, and industry held belief that the private maritime 
security providers are yet another armed group that needs to be further regulated.
26
  
Much of this perception, like similar situations in Iraq, has arisen from stories or even videos 
or fear, rather than direct evidence and scholarly assessment of the legal machinery which 
governs this sector. Nonetheless, it has fueled the belief that the provision and oversight of 
private security operations at sea is more complicated than on land. Complicated, the legal 
regime may indeed be, but as evidenced by the numerous hard and soft law instruments which 






                                                        
23 (Example: BBC, “India allows Italian ship Enrica Lexie to leave,”2 May 2012, Available at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-17920840 (Accessed 24 August 2014)). 
24 (Example: Gulf Ship News, AdvanFort vessel arrested with illegal arms onboard, Available at: 
http://www.gulfshipnews.com/news_content.php?fid=3w3c499 (Accessed: 24 August 2014)). 
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3. International Legal Framework Governing Maritime Security 
Before analyzing legal frameworks which govern maritime security activities, an important 
legal distinction must be made between peacetime legal frameworks and laws which apply 
during times of armed conflict. During times of war, and naval warfare is no exception, Hague 
Law, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocols, along with the specific legislation that 
applies to naval warfare and maritime operations as codified in the San Remo Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea are in-force.  
During peacetime, UNCLOS remains the over-arching legal regime for oceans management.
27
 
UNCLOS, however, does include a brief, though nonetheless specific, security component, 
addressing key tenets of responding to piracy amongst other issues and seeks to promote all 
states’ cooperation and peaceful uses of the oceans. 
In today’s international security paradigm, however, distinctions between war and peace are 
not so clear, and thus the applicability of the UNCLOS regime with regard to maritime security 
is often called into question. Traditional, state-on-state warfare, for which naval combat has 
become so excessively prepared, is being replaced by two forms of non-state actors, 
embodying both threats to maritime security and protectors of international shipping 
commerce. In this situation, marked by low intensity conflict on the water, an absence of state-
on-state warfare and a presence of non-state actors, such as terrorists, pirates, armed robbers on 
one hand, and PCASP on the other, the Law of Armed conflict lays dormant, and UNCLOS is 
the dominant regime. 
3.1. UNCLOS 
Law of the sea sources, specifically the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 
(UNCLOS),
28
 provides an engaging starting point for regulatory analysis of private maritime 
                                                        
27 Rothwell, Donald; Stevens, Tim, The International Law of the Sea, 2010, p. 258. 
28 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Signed on 10 December 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica. 
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security. UNCLOS sets the backdrop for oceans management, providing the foundation for 
uniform ocean governance.  
UNCLOS is often regarded a framework convention; it sets up institutions, balances rights, 
obligations, and interests of states in different capacities with interests of the international 
community. It is supplemented by other conventions, organizations, treaties, protocols, and 
even soft law. 
Yet UNCLOS does much more than simply set up broad frameworks. It also specifies detailed 
nautical mile limits of maritime zones, establishes rules of the road, and other highly technical 
criteria for oceans management and seaborne operation. 
The Convention provides two specific regimes which are fundamental to maritime security; the 
regime of consecutive maritime zones and the jurisdiction trinity-- flag, coastal, and port state 
control. In fact, UNCLOS is the only international convention which stipulates a framework 
for state jurisdiction on the oceans. 
3.1.1. Maritime Zones 
UNCLOS sections the oceans, splitting marine areas into five main zones, each with different 
legal status. These are Internal Waters, Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ), and High Seas. 
UNCLOS provides the backbone for offshore governance by coastal states and those 
navigating the oceans. This convention does not only zone coastal states’ offshore areas, but 
provides specific guidance for states’ rights and responsibilities in the said concentric zones.
29
 
3.1.1.1. Internal Waters 
Internal waters include littoral areas such as ports, rivers, inlets, and other marine spaces 
landward of the baseline (low-water line).
30
 In these spaces, the port state has jurisdiction to 
enforce domestic regulations upon vessels in its internal waters, specifically ports. Such 
enforcement measures can be taken for violations of static standards while at the port as well as 
for violations having occurred within the coastal state’s maritime zones and beyond. However, 
foreign vessels are not usually held to non-maritime or security port state laws such as those 
                                                        
29 Williams, Simon, “Offshore Installations: Practical Security and Legal Considerations,” MAST EurAsia Confex, Istanbul, 
Turkey, 21 May 2014, p.3. 
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governing religious practice or sexual orientation, so long as activities conducted are  not to 
detrimental to the peace and security of the locale. 
In the maritime security context, specifically, however, a coastal state can prevent PCASP 
from entering their ports and internal waters if carriage of weapons is forbidden national 
legislation. Moreover, once entering port, PCASP (and the vessel which they are aboard) can 
be held accountable for other violations which took place on seas, granted that they in some-
way impacted the port state or for other reasons with the permission of the flag state. 
3.1.1.2. Territorial Sea 
In the territorial sea, a coastal state has unlimited jurisdiction over all (including foreign) 
activities unless restrictions are imposed by law. All coastal states have the right to a territorial 
sea extending 12 nautical miles (nm) from baselines.
31
 
This measurement evolved from the “Canon Shot procedure” which historically set a 3 nm 
minimum, now the customary international law mandatory minimum which compulsorily 
gives coastal states territory at least 3 nm seaward, and allocates them all the responsibilities 
that come with it. Thus 3 nm is the automatic allocation, and anything else up to 12 nm must to 
be set by proclamation, though it is arguably becoming customary international law for 12 nm 
to be the standard norm. 
In the maritime security context, the coastal state can set and enforce any laws to restrict 
movement of PCASP, forbid maritime security operations (including making illegal the 
carriage or discharge of weapons) within the territorial sea, so long as it is not prejudicial to 
general freedom of navigation/innocent passage.
32
 
3.1.1.3. Contiguous Zone 
The contiguous zone is an intermediary zone between the territorial sea and the high seas, 
extending enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal to a maximum of 24 nm from baselines for 
the purposes of  preventing or punishing violations of customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary 
(and thus residual national security) legislation.
33
 
                                                        
31 UNCLOS, Part II, Section 2, Article 3. 
32 UNCLOS, Article 27. 
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In the maritime security context, this can certainly include monitoring any activities which can 
result in armed violence or weapons import into the state. Therefore the coastal state can take 
measures to prevent or regulate armed maritime security activates out to 24nm under the 
reasoning it is undertaking customs enforcement operations to prevent movement of arms into 
its waters/ports. 
3.1.1.4. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
The EEZ is another intermediary zone, which lies between the territorial sea (12 nm) and the 
high seas to the maximum extent of 200 nm. Although high seas freedoms concerning general 
navigation principles remain in place, in this zone the coastal state maintains exclusive 
sovereignty over exploring, exploiting, and conserving all natural resources.
34
 The coastal state 
therefore can take action to prevent infringement by third parties of its economic assets in this 
area, including, inter alia, fishing, bioprospecting, and wind-farming. In order to safeguard 
these rights, the coastal state may take necessary measures, including boarding, inspection, 




3.1.1.5. High Seas 
High seas are to be open and freely available to all, governed by principle of equal rights for 
all. In agreeing to UNCLOS, all states parties acknowledged that the oceans are for peaceful 
purposes. (the convention’s aim is to maintain peace, justice, and progress for all people of the 
world.) On the high-seas (beyond 200 nm), no states can act/interfere with justified and equal 
interests of other states. The Convention establishes freedom of activity in six fields: 
1. Navigation 
2. Overflight 
3. Laying of cables and pipelines 
4. Artificial islands and installations 
5. Fishing 
6. Marine Scientific research 
                                                        
34 UNCLOS, Part V, Article 56. 
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Freedom of navigation is of utmost importance for all, and maritime security activities can be 
considered part of navigational activities, as they protect vessels from interferences in 
navigation by third parties. 
3.1.1.6. Problems with the Zone Structure and Counter-Piracy in the Maritime 
Security Law Context 
Understanding geographic location of attacks does not only assist in developing appropriate 
maritime security strategies for PCASP, but can also assist legal scholars in assessing the 
congruence of international legal frameworks governing threat response measures.
36 
  
UNCLOS classifies piracy as offences committed on the high seas,
37
 which leaves open a huge 
gap—piracy-like threats within a coastal state’s jurisdiction. In order to rectify this missing 
designation as a crime IMO MSC members have introduced a separate term “armed robbery 
against ships” to address similar crimes occurring within state’s jurisdiction (i.e. territorial and 
internal waters).
38
 This is defined as “any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of 
depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and 
directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s 
internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea.”
 39
 
Thus the combined phrase “piracy and armed robbery against ships” together has become a 




                                                        
36 UNOSAT, op. cit., p. 25. 
37 UNCLOS, Art. 101. Definition: Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
• (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
• (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
• (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
• (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a 
pirate ship or aircraft; 
• (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b). 
38 (Note: This has been used in IMO MSC statements, guidelines, and clarifications as well as further supplemented in SUA, as 
described in detail in sections 3.2.1.) 
39IMO Assembly resolution A.922(22) “Code of practice for the investigation of the crimes of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships,” adopted in November 2001, updated in December 2009 by IMO Assembly resolution A.1025(26) on Code of 








As evidenced in the above chart, piracy attacks in the Indian Ocean region, for example, are 
most frequent on the High Seas, beyond coastal state jurisdiction. This affects regulation of 
threat responses, and state oversight of PCASP, because no coastal state has jurisdiction on the 
high seas, as would be the case conversely should armed robbery attacks, and security 
responses thereto, occur in territorial or internal waters (ports). However, this does not make 
the high seas ungoverned, as other types of jurisdiction are present governing counter-piracy 
operations and PCASP activity. 
3.1.2. Types of Jurisdiction 
Numerous types of jurisdiction can be rendered from UNCLOS and international law broadly. 
First, three main types of jurisdiction activities exist, combined with three categories of 
maritime states which can have jurisdiction. First there is Prescriptive jurisdiction, or the power 
to make rules.
41
 Second, there is Enforcement jurisdiction, this is the power to apply rules, 
monitor compliance, conduct inspections, and make arrests. Third, there is Adjudicative 
jurisdiction; this is the power to undertake court proceedings after enforcement. 
These three types of jurisdiction apply to states and can fall into both Territorial and extra-
territorial jurisdiction. Territory refers to the domain over which a state maintains power 
(generally its physical/political borders. To act outside those limits, “extra-territorially, it needs 
justification, which is based on certain principles.  
                                                        
40 Figure 1. from: UNOSAT Global Report on Maritime Piracy a geospatial analysis 1995-2013, p. 26. 
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Principles for extra-territorial jurisdiction: 
 Nationality (i.e. flag state jurisdiction) 
 Impacts, effects, protective, security (wherever you are, subject to laws) 
 Universality (i.e. piracy—protect the common good, danger for all)42 
 Treaty, whatever rationale. 
The aforementioned principles overlap, thus concurrent jurisdiction exists: i.e. vessels have 
nationality of one state, fishing agreement of another state, crew from five states, etc.) 
In the maritime, specifically private maritime security context, six or more states may have 
jurisdiction over private maritime security activities at any one time: the flag state of the 
merchant ship, the state where the shipping company is registered, the home state or states of 
the merchant crew, the state where the private security company is registered, the home states 
of the individual security guards, and the coastal state whose waters they transit or ports they 
enter. Thus oversight of private maritime security operations becomes confusing as state 




UNCLOS regime channels three types of maritime states: Coastal State, Port, State, and Flag 
States, however, the balance of power between flag and coastal states under UNCLOS tilts in 
favor of Flag States.
44
 
However, when we discuss regulation of private security in the maritime context, additional 
states also come into play, which will be further discussed in a following section regarding the 
Montreux Document in section 4.2. of this paper. 
3.1.2.1. Flag State Jurisdiction 
Flag State refers to the country where a vessel is registered. This country has extra-territorial 
jurisdiction over its vessels sailing anywhere in the world by virtue of the nationality principle.
 
45 
 Every state has the right to sail ships under its flag and thus participate in international 
                                                        
42  (Note: While UNCLOS prescribes universal state jurisdiction over piracy, there is no universal state jurisdiction regulating 
private counter-piracy activities and other security measures at sea.) 
43 America’s Future, “Warships for Hire, a Private Solution to Maritime Piracy,” available at 
http://americasfuture.org/doublethink/2013/07/warships-for-hire-a-private-solution-to-maritime-piracy/ (Accessed: 20 June 
2014). 
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navigation. However, this right comes with certain responsibilities. Flag states are responsible 
for enforcing international obligations everywhere and exclusively on high seas over their 
vessels.
 46
 This is derived from Article 94 of UNCLOS which stipulates that “every state shall 
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical, and social matters 
over ships flying its flag.”
 47
 Flag State Jurisdiction typically includes management of vessel 
registration, effective jurisdiction and control over vessels including inspection, detention, and 
arrest as necessary, as well as ensuring vessel conformity to generally accepted international 
rules and standards (GAIRS). 
In the context of flag states, GAIRS are the mandatory minimum standards, and flag states can, 
at will, establish more stringent requirements aboard their vessels. In the case of maritime 
security, many can and do establish stricter measures for vetting, employing, operating, and 
reporting of PCASP, as well as carrying weapons than is mandated by the IMO or 
recommended by the international community.
48
 
Flag state regulations, however, generally only cover issues such as the types of weapon 
systems that can be brought onboard by PCASP, how many guards can be embarked, 
certification requirements and background credentials for embarked PCASP, and in some 
circumstances application procedures to gain Flag State approval for taking a security detail 
onboard.
49 
However, these flag-state restrictions do not address other pertinent issues such as 
embark and disembark procedures for PCASP, which frequently take place in other countries 
beside the Flag State, Rules for the Use of Force, oversight and reporting protocols, and code 
of conduct.
 50
 Moreover for many Flag States a licensing system for PCASP or anti-piracy 
teams is non-existent.
 51
 Enforcement of Flag State regulations upon PCASP is frequently 
impossible because operations often take place vast distances away from the country of 
registration and shielded from the eyes of observers.
 52
 As many vessels are registered in open 
                                                        
46 Hosanee, Nivedita, A Critical Analysis of Flag State Duties as Laid Down Under Article 94 of UNCLOS, United Nations, 
2009. 
47 Pozdnakova, Alla, Criminal Jurisdiction over Perpetrators of Ship-Source Pollution: International Law, State Practice and 
EU Harmonisation, 2013, p. 111. 
48 Kraska, James, “International Regulation of Private Maritime Security Companies”, Information Paper Series 13-4, US 
Naval War College, 5 June 2013, p. 3. 
49 (Example: Williams, Simon, “Deciphering the Japanese Ship Guarding Act,” The Maritime Executive, Available at: 
http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Deciphering-the-Japanese-Ship-Guarding-Act-2014-07-01 (Accessed: 27 August 
2014)). 
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registries or flag of convenience states which maintain little tangible oversight over their 
vessels, verification, let alone inspection is near impossible. 
“Flag states enjoy the capacity to prescribe laws… applicable to their 
vessels, wherever those vessels may be. They may also enforce these laws not 
only in their ports and in their territorial seas, but also on the high seas. Flag 
state capacity and flag state responsibility are of course quite different things; 
the existence of entitlement to exercise jurisdiction over vessels is no 
guarantee that this competence will be utilized.”
 53
 
- Rothwell & Stephens 
This is best depicted in the flag of convenience and open registry system which exponentially 
complicates jurisdiction, accountability, and oversight.
54
  Ship-owners can simply change 
vessel registration from one open registry to another, which changes the nationality (and 
therefore Flag State Jurisdiction) of the vessel in order to place it under a jurisdiction with 
greater or lesser leniency in accountability and oversight for PCASP management depending 
on their wishes.
55
 For example, a ship-owner with a tanker flagged in Japan, a country with 
arguably the most stringent PCASP who desires more flexibility, can simply reflag to a state 
that is not willing or able to exercise jurisdiction and control, like Liberia, an open registry 
with virtually no PCASP oversight, in order to ease regulations aboard his/her vessel.
56
 
The flag state is also the only state (in addition to the state where an individual is a national) 
which can institute proceedings against a person who is alleged to conduct an violation at sea.
57
 
This is according to Article 97 (1) of UNCLOS. This Article was created for general 
investigation and prosecution for duty misconduct aboard a vessel, such as causing a collision. 
However, it can arguably be relevant in the case of PCASP inclusive of activities to mitigate a 
potential pirate or terrorist attack, loss of life, or any firearms discharge, perhaps even resulting 
in the wrongful death of a third party. On the other hand, it could exclude any deliberate use of 
force on high seas as collision implies accidental incident, and even further can be argued that 
a death by shooting or otherwise not onboard the vessel does not interfere with navigation. 
                                                        
53 Rothwell, Stephens, op. cit., p. 353. 
54 Jakobi; Dieter Wolf, op. cit. 
55 Liss, Caroline, “ Regulating Private Military and Security Companies at Sea: New Developments and Challenges” Institute 
for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA), Regional Response to Maritime Piracy: Enhancing Public-Private 
Partnerships and Strengthening Global Engagement, June 2012, p. 4. 
56 (Example: Williams, “Deciphering the Japanese Ship Guarding Act,” op. cit.) 




  © 2014  Simon O. Williams     
Nonetheless, as Italian Prime Minister, H.E. Mario Monti, stated to the UN General Assembly, 
26 September 2012, “international efforts to protect sea lanes and fight piracy can be effective 
only if all nations cooperate in good faith, according to the established rules of the international 




Flag states, are required to adopt laws to ensure international regulations are applied and 
enforced upon vessels which fly its flag. Flag states are to take appropriate measures to ensure 
that vessels flying their flag are prohibited from sailing unless they can proceed to sea in 
compliance with standards.
 59
 Furthermore, they are tasked under customary international law 
and directly under UNCLOS with investigating and punishing violations aboard their vessels 
irrespective of where the infraction took place.
 60
 
Flag states may, however, delegate some authority to classification societies to inspect vessels 
and issue certificates to vessel/crew, or similarly to port or other states to inspect their vessels 
when geographically displaced. This is crucial because the flag state may be very remote from 
its vessel, whereas a coastal (or even port) state may be closer, and the vessel will eventually 
make call at port, where the port state can make inspection on behalf of the flag state.
61
 
3.1.2.2. Coastal State Jurisdiction 
There is no prohibition of concurrent jurisdiction under UNCLOS, and vessels therefore can be 
subject to the jurisdiction of states besides the flag state in certain circumstances, such as 
entering their maritime zones and ports.  
 
The prescriptive power of coastal states can be seen as a way to control the condition of ships 
navigating lawfully in their territorial seas. UNCLOS lays down rules for enforcement powers 
by coastal states toward vessels in their maritime zones, specifically in their territorial sea.
62 
This is most importantly derived from Article 27, which provides direct details for coastal state 
jurisdiction, specifically stating that:  
                                                        
58  Monti, Mario, Prime Minister of Italy, Statement to the United Nations General Assembly  26 September 2012 available at: 
http://www.governo.it/Presidente/Interventi/testo_int.asp?d=69280 (Accessed 24 August 2014). 
59 Rothwell, Stephens, op. cit., p. 355. 
60 ibid. 
61 Kaye, S., “International measures to protect oil platforms, pipelines, and submarine cables from attack,” Tulane Maritime 
Law Journal, (2007), Volume 31, p. 394. 
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1. The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exercised 
on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any 
person or to conduct any investigation in connection with any crime 
committed on board the ship during its passage, save only in the 
following cases: 
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; 
(b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the 
good order of the territorial sea; 
(c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by 
the master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of 
the flag State; or 
(d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 
2. The above provisions do not affect the right of the coastal State to 
take any steps authorized by its laws for the purpose of an arrest or 
investigation on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea 
after leaving internal waters. 
3. In the cases provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2, the coastal State 
shall, if the master so requests, notify a diplomatic agent or consular 
officer of the flag State before taking any steps, and shall facilitate 
contact between such agent or officer and the ship's crew. In cases of 
emergency this notification may be communicated while the measures 
are being taken. 
4. In considering whether or in what manner an arrest should be made, 
the local authorities shall have due regard to the interests of navigation. 
5. Except as provided in Part XII or with respect to violations of laws 
and regulations adopted in accordance with Part V, the coastal State 
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territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in 
connection with any crime committed before the ship entered the 
territorial sea, if the ship, proceeding from a foreign port, is only 
passing through the territorial sea without entering internal waters. 
This clear article indicates the measures a coastal state can take to ensure peace and good-order 
in their territorial sea. Carriage of arms and PCASP in fire positions can arguably be 
threatening to the good-order, and as mentioned above, and may also be contrary to customs 
regimes regarding import of arms, should the PCASP have intent to embark or disembark with 
weapons within/from the coastal state’s ports (sans licenses). Such a provision allows the 
coastal state necessary latitude to take measures to investigate or prevent such an occurrence. 
This article, however, is careful, in sub-section five to prevent creeping coastal state 
jurisdiction over violations which have occurred prior to the ship entering the territorial sea 
from a foreign port, granted it is in transit and not entering the coastal state’s internal waters or 
ports. Further discussion of this matter can be found in sections 3.1.3. and 3.1.4. of this paper 
regarding innocent passage and prior notification, respectively. 
In order for a coastal state enforce further control beyond the territorial sea in the EEZ, they 
must contact the subject vessel’s flag state to fulfill flag state obligations, or develop and 
exercise port state jurisdiction. Eventually, ship will have to make call at a port. National 
legislation criminalizing PCASP violations or agreements with other port states with related 
legislation can then provide port state jurisdiction to enforce compliance as described below. 
3.1.2.3. Port State Jurisdiction 
Port state jurisdiction is not covered by UNCLOS directly, but UNCLOS provisions confirm 
this practice, indicative of “residual jurisdiction in relation to port-state-control.”
63
 This is 
especially important in the private maritime security context. If understanding flag state 
jurisdiction on the high seas and coastal state jurisdiction in the territorial sea are both 
challenging, then what happens when a ship-borne security team heads to port? A myriad of 
national rules and regulations then come into force regarding the disembarkation of personnel, 
equipment (especially weapons), etc., making more mayhem in the legal machinery 
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Although each port state has its individual traits in regards to legislation governing the carriage 
or off/loading of weapons in their ports, there are a number of issues remaining common to all, 
most notably the prevention of undocumented immigration and proliferation of small arms and 
light weapons (SALW) that could result from disembarkation of PCASP in their ports. 
In an effort to enhance broader security issues, especially good governance, anti-trafficking, 
anti-corruption, and counter- SALW proliferation. Port states take measures to prevent 
unwanted vessels, including those with armed security teams from entering or disembarking at 
their ports. Port State Control compliments the obligation of flag states to inspect and control 
vessels, by undertaking investigation or verification at vessels calling at their port to ensure 
they comply with international obligations or standards.
 64
 In case of violation they can be 
forced to pay reparations to the port state, refit, reform, arrest, or even blacklist.  
Generally, the port state control arrangement is the epitome for investigating and apprehending 
violators irrespective of a vessel’s flag as it will eventually need to make berth to unload 
cargo.
65
 Port state control violation inspections are most frequently targeted for pollution 
matters, however, there have been numerous investigations and vessel arrests in recent years 
due the proliferation of small arms for defensive purposes and armed maritime security teams 
on-board in violation of the port-state’s domestic legislation.
66
 This is indicative of port-state-
control crack-downs on maritime security operations, to push for better standards, compliance, 
or keep unwanted PCASP activities at bay. 
Interestingly, a study by the Rajamathan School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore 
has yielded remarkable results, suggesting that substandard ships in pollution control and 
shipboard compliance are also more likely to be victims of piratical attack than ships in stellar 
condition. 
“Well-operated and maintained vessels will follow the best management 
practice guidelines to avoid attack recommended by the IMO and ship 
owner associations, but poor quality vessels are less likely to do so…Of the 
54 commercial vessels hijacked by Somali pirates in 2010 and 2011, 23 
                                                        
64 IMO, Port State Control, Available at: http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic_id=159 (Accessed: 20 June 2014). 
65 Rothwell, Stephens, op. cit., p. 354. 
66 (Example: Helman, Christopher, “Venezuela Holds U.S. Vessel And Crew On Suspicion Of Arms Trafficking,” Forbes, 
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vessels, or about 42% of the total hijacked, could be assessed as being sub-
standard either by virtue of age and their PSC record.”
67
 
- Sam Bateman, RSIS 
Thus, tightening port state control inspections, cracking-down on fraud, ports of convenience, 
and other deficiencies in this system for non-maritime security inspections could actually have 
a positive effect on adherence to maritime security recommendations and subsequently lower 
victim rates. 
3.1.3. Innocent Passage 
UNCLOS enshrines the concept of innocent passage through a coastal state’s territorial sea.
68
 




However, it remains unclear as to whether PCASP employment aboard a commercial vessels is 
prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state and thus contrary to 
innocent passage.
70
 Each coastal state has its own interpretation as to whether specific vessels 
in its territorial sea may be prejudicial to peace, good, order, or security. At present, no global 
standard is defined regarding carriage of arms, armed personnel, personnel in fire positions, 
and other relevant condition, thus legal debate remains. 
Some parallels can be drawn, however, from distinctions of innocent and non-innocent passage 
for military vessels. Military vessels must travel in “normal mode,” which means they must: 
 No submerged transit of submarines 
 No activities necessary for the security of surface warships (such as formation 
steaming and other force protection measures) 
While this is specifically in regard to military vessels, armed guards aboard commercial vessels 
may be considered by some to be a force-protection measure and therefore a violation of 
innocent passage, especially if they are in fire positions. Supporters of this view rely on Article 
19 (2) (b), which states  
                                                        
67 Bateman, op. cit., p. 196. 
68 UNCLOS, Part II, Article 17. 
69 UNCLOS, Article 19 (1). 
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“Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal state if in the territorial sea it engages 




Supporters of armed guards, on the other hand, maintain that mere carriage of weapons, locked 
or stowed, for example, certainly cannot be considered exercise or practice. Similarly, using a 
weapon in a bona fide self-defense situation against inter-alia piracy, armed robbery, or 
terrorism would also not classify as exercise or practice. 
Yet, despite this, some coastal states continue to argue against innocent passage if crews are in 
battle stations/fire positions, and not traveling in “Normal Mode.” Normal mode has been 
defined for transit passage situations in Corfu Channel Case,
72
 but the same definition and 
particulars are often extended to the innocent passage debate regarding both warships and 
employment of PCASP. According to the Virginia Commentaries (Vol 2, 342):  
“it is clear from the context and from the negotiating history that the term 
was intended to refer to the mode which is normal or usual for navigation 
for the particular type of ship…. Making the passage in given 
circumstances….” “Some guidance on this point can again be found in 
Corfu Channel where the ICJ was satisfied that even when the British 
warships passed through the channel with crews at action stations, and 




By this interpretation, armed guards manning battle stations, preparing for contingencies, can 
be considered normal mode in high-risk situations where an attack could occur, and thus 
qualify as innocent passage. 
Moreover, modern interpretations of UNCLOS, especially in regard to environmental security, 
stress that actual damage [environmental, violent, or other] has to occur before a coastal state 
can declare a vessel’s passage in its territorial sea non-innocent.
74
 According to legal scholar 
Erik Molenaar, one of the most challenging things for a coastal state is to establish, without-a-
                                                        
71 Askins, Stephen, “Piracy- Issues Arising from the Use of Armed Guards,” Ince & Co Shipping Brief, 2012, p. 3. 
72  ICJ, The Corfu Channel Case, (United Kingdom v. Albania). ICJ Decision of 9 April 1949, Para.  4, 31. 
73 Rothwell, Stephens, op. cit.,  p. 272. 
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doubt, that a ship is in non-innocent passage, if wrongly accused, the coastal state can be held 
liable for damages to the ship or charterer. 
75
 
This is corroborated by Donald Rothwell and Tim Stephens, in their pertinent Law of the Sea 
text, which argues: 
“A number of issues arise from these provisions [of innocent passage]. One 
is the capacity of the coastal state to interpret the [Law of the Sea 
Convention] unilaterally and determine that either the mere presence of a 
warship within the territorial sea constitutes a threat to its security, or that 
the actions of the warship whilst engaged in passage are not innocent. 
There is a widely held view that a presumption of innocence exists, which 
can only be rebutted by proof from the coastal state, relying upon the 
objective and specific criteria in Article 19, of a non-innocent act.
 76
 
Moreover, their assessment continues, reaffirming that military and commercial vessels alike 
always enjoy the right of innocent passage and self defense whilst within the territorial sea of a 
foreign state, granted they do not undertake in activities which can be interpreted as a threat to 
the coastal state or engage in the use of force against the coastal state;
 77
 including the 





In the contemporary maritime security context, defending a vessel against bona fide pirates or 
terrorists would not be a use of force against the coastal state because the attackers are hostis 
humani generis,
79
 or enemies of all mankind, not representative of nation-states in today’s 
paradigm. By this logic, engaging in genuine self-defense against pirates would not necessarily 
be a violation of innocent passage. 
The second part of this interpretation, regarding the “launching, landing, or taking aboard any 
aircraft or military device,”
80
 however, may complicate the matter as PCASP themselves must 
eventually embark, disembark, and/or load and offload their weapons at some port or at a 
floating armory. Should these activities take place, specifically via floating armory or other 
                                                        
75 ibid. 
76 Rothwell, Stephens, op. cit., p. 268. 
77 ibid. 
78 UNCLOS, Part II, Article 19 (2) (f). 
79 Coke, Edward, Institutes of the Laws of England, 1628, Part III, Chapter 49, p. 113. 




  © 2014  Simon O. Williams     
vessel in a state’s territorial sea without that coastal state’s permission, it may be considered as 
taking aboard a “military device,” and thus a violation of innocent passage.
81
 This is especially 
true if the weapons taken aboard are not for commercial, private, maritime security personnel, 
but for a military vessel protection detail (VPD,) in which a small team of military personnel 
are deployed to a commercial vessel, usually by the flag state, to protect it while transiting high 
risk areas. 
The concept of VPDs further complicates the innocent passage regime, as it introduces military 
personnel, equipment, and activities directly into the commercial maritime sector, aboard 
private vessels. However, despite VPD presence, a vessel itself remains a commercial ship, 
lacks clear markings identifying it as being on government service, because it has simply taken 
aboard agents on government service to protect the vessel, not changed its designation to a 
government ship immune by UNLCOS and authorized to take action against pirates.
82
 The 
VPD is simply performing point-to-point protection against piratical attacks. Neither the VPD 
or the civilian client vessel is authorized to patrol the seas, board, inspect or arrest suspect 
pirate ships. Yet, transit of commercial vessels with embarked VPDs, could still, by some, be 
considered a type of military passage, due to the presence of military personnel and thus arouse 
other suspicions or concerns. 
This is especially true following the Enrica Lexie incident, where Italian marines as part of an 
embarked VPD opened fire and killed Indian fishermen.
83
 If coastal states interpret this 
unfortunate incident in line with India’s perspective, that trigger-happy guards are posing 
danger to their nationals who transit, work, or leisure in those waters it may lead to increased 
coastal state calls for VPDs to be regulated in a different manner, and their roles, rights, and 
obligations to be clarified in international law. 
Another issue is that VPD (as military personnel) are trained to follow very strict and defined 
rules of engagement through traditional military chain of command. Yet in the commercial 
maritime setting, VPD personnel may have to be re-wired to take orders from a civilian ship 
Master or learn to take decisions independently. Some governments have made agreements to 
codify such relationships. For example, the Italian ministry of defense signed a memorandum 
                                                        
81 (Note: Carriage of firearms or other weapons systems within contiguous zone and/or territorial sea can be viewed, 
potentially, as being in breach of a coastal states weapons import/export laws, licensing laws, and thus justify to interference.) 
82 UNCLOS, Part II, Subsection C, Article 32; UNCLOS, Part VII, Article 95; Part VII, Article 96. 
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of understanding with Italian Shipowners Association indicating that ship Masters have no 
responsibility to oversee VPD personnel. Such policies are further discussed in the section 
3.2.2. of this paper in relation to SOLAS. 
3.1.4. Prior Notification: 
Building on the discussion of innocent passage, above, the topic of prior notification naturally 
follows suit as some coastal states request that vessels carrying armed security personnel 
provide prior notification to their maritime authority before entering their territorial sea.
84
 
Legal debate remains as to whether international law requires transiting vessels employing 
PCASP to adhere to this coastal state request or if a requirement for prior notification is a 
violation of the right to innocent passage. 
Differing interpretations between East and West have traditionally existed regarding the 
concept of prior notification. This precedent is historically evident in naval passage contexts, 
but the trends can be applied to the commercial vessels as well. 
To put this debate to rest, the two most powerful naval countries of the Cold War, the USA and 
USSR issued, in 1989, a Joint Statement on the Uniform Interpretation of Rules of 
International Law Governing Innocent Passage which provided as follows: 
“All ships, including warships, regardless of cargo, armament, 
or means of propulsion enjoy the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea in accordance with international law, 




Twenty-five years since issue of this Statement, it has in many contexts, been accepted by the 
international community and carries substantial weight in operations planning, analysis, and 
legal debate by government and industry players.
 86
 It reaffirms trends set by the major 
international powers of the time that ships do not need prior notification to enter territorial seas 
under innocent passage 
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3.2. Legal Security Response Beyond UNCLOS 
UNCLOS was ahead of its time, pre-empting environmental protection and low intensity 
conflict paradigm shifts of the late 1990s by already encompassing many ‘new’ security 
challenges at the time of its codification in 1982; including environmental security, 
immigration, and piracy.
87
 This allowed UNCLOS to remain relatively flexible and current 
with international security strategic concepts.  
But are further changes in the maritime security threat and threat-response arena required 
additional instruments to support UNCLOS, in order to provide sufficient legal basis to meet 
and regulate contemporary security responses? 
The global character of shipping requires global regulation, and UNCLOS is not alone in this 
endeavor. There is not simply one international treaty on maritime security law. While 
UNCLOS includes several articles relating to state responses against piracy (Articles 100 to 
107 and 110), the Convention provides no foundation or guidance for private efforts for 
combating piracy.
88
 Instead there are many fragmented treaties, conventions, legal principles 
and soft law instruments which supplement UNCLOS.  
Although UNCLOS sets the static legal framework of maritime zones and jurisdiction, the 
convention is silent in regard to specific non-state actions for countering piracy, and has no 
specific comments about responses to piracy beyond state jurisdiction in Articles 100 to 107 
and 110.
89
 Instead, a kaleidoscope of overlapping, confusing, and occasionally conflicting 
international and domestic policies, practices, and laws have emerged in an attempt to tame 
this often considered unwieldy industry. 
UNCLOS is static in order to provide a stable platform, but must also be dynamic to adapt to 
changes and developments evolving within the international law arena. As alluded to above, it 
                                                        
87 Aldis, Anne; Herd, Graeme, "Managing Soft Security Threats: Current Progress and Future Prospects," 
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is a framework convention, and therefore sets the playing field and rules-of-the-game for 
interaction between other instruments. 
Therefore, UNCLOS is not a standalone, all-encompassing code for the seas. It is 
complimented and implemented by a large number of global, regional, and bilateral 
instruments and bodies, as well as legal principles. These other instruments can be viewed as 
having the same objective as UNLCOS—standardization and uniformity, but are different, 
even supplementary, tools. 
Problems of ocean spaces, specifically security affairs, are closely related amongst maritime 
zones and countries, however, as maritime security specific issues are not so comprehensively 
presented in UNCLOS, other international conventions, international organizations, soft law, 
and even national legislation, has emerged to supplement the framework convention and 
implement its stipulated policies. 
3.2.1. SUA 
The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) 
Convention and Protocol was designed to fill voids in international law necessary to combat 
other threats to human life and security of navigation and commerce at sea not fully prescribed 
under UNCLOS.
90
 It requires state parties to pass legislation making unlawful piratical and 
terroristic type acts against navigation described in the treaty a serious criminal offenses in 
their national law. The SUA framework came in two waves.  
3.2.1.1. SUA Framework 1988 
First was the 1988 Convention and Protocol. Under this legislation, states parties have an 
obligation to establish jurisdiction to extradite or prosecute violators even if the alleged 
offenses were committed outside their physical territory.  
Unlike the UNCLOS definition of piracy,
91
 which only applies on the high seas, and therefore 
only allows responses on the high seas, the SUA framework criminalizes piracy-like offences 
against vessels which have journeyed out of the territorial sea or are scheduled to transit 
                                                        
90 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), Signed on 10 March 
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beyond the territorial sea.
92
 Yet, a major gap in the 1988 SUA framework is that it only 
permitted flag states jurisdiction to mitigate, investigate, and respond to threats on, against, or 
utilizing their vessels. 
3.2.1.2. SUA Framework 2005  
In 2005, the 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol were amended to become the 2005 SUA 
Convention and the 2005 SUA Protocol. The 2005 SUA framework contains three new 
categories of offenses.  
1. Using a ship as a weapon or as a means for committing terrorist acts 
2. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the high seas 
3. Transporting a person alleged to have committed an offense under other UN anti-
terrorism conventions.  
In addition the 2005 SUA framework broadened state jurisdiction, to include not only the flag 
state, but also third states.
93
 Thus, the SUA frameworks further the extent of criminalizing acts 
against navigation beyond UNCLOS, increasing states’ legal latitude to prevent attacks and 
pursue violators in maritime zones shoreside of the High Seas. Examining the SUA framework 
from the broadest perspective, it is evident that it provides an agreement condemning maritime 
threats, acknowledging that countermeasures must be taken in shore-ward maritime zones, 
including, but not exclusively private ship borne responses to threat mitigation. Standards and 
guidelines for private responses have been created via the necessary channels in IMO such as 
SOLAS described below, and in the private sector as indicated in the subsequent section. 
3.2.2. SOLAS  
The Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, first developed to increase safety aboard ocean 
going vessels after the Titanic disaster, has grown since 1914 into the most thorough marine 
safety convention. Its main purpose is to establish minimum standards for the construction, 
equipment and operation of ships, compatible with their safety.
94
 It is enforced by flag states 
and port state control measures. 
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In relation to private maritime security, a main legal conundrum with SOLAS is whether 
employing armed security on board a vessel can deprive the ship’s master of their overall 
responsibility to control all actions aboard their vessel, as required by SOLAS.  If so, this 
would be in contradiction to SOLAS Reg 34-1 and Reg 8, Chapter XI-2.
95
 Many coastal states 
have taken additional steps to clarify the relationship between master and PCASP, amending 
national legislation to reaffirm the Master’s overall authority to authorize PCASP targeting, 
deployment, and ultimately target engagement (specifically weapons discharge of any-kind). In 
an effort to resolve this dispute, the largest international shipping association, the Baltic 
International Maritime Council (BIMCO) has released a commercial contract template, 
GUARDCON, which establishes this clear line of superiority with the ship’s Master remaining 
in command at all times.
96
 
Despite this being reaffirmed in SOLAS, by flag states, and even in many industry contracts 
between PCASP and ship-owners/operators, many PCASP claim that in certain grave life-or-
death situations, they would disobey a master’s call to stand-down under their individual right 
to self defense should they believe their life or life of the crew to be in danger. GUARDCON 
aims to accommodate this extenuating circumstance, acting a contract between PCASP and 
Master to break this link in chain-of-command, freeing PCASP to act at will, without the 
Master’s orders, and outside the conventional SOLAS protocols. 
Relating this back to the Port State Control section, SOLAS allows port states to prevent ships 
from sailing when serious deficiencies are found that  may pose a danger to persons, property, 
or the environment.”
97
 This can be extended to implementation of maritime security procedures 
within SOLAS and its family of regulations (ISPS, ISM etc) if PCASP, their behavior, or their 
equipment seem to be substandard and as a result a danger to those aboard the vessel, or the 
public. 
 
3.2.3. U.N. Firearms Protocol 
In addition to law of the sea framework, especially flag and port state general maritime 
legislation, PCASP must also navigate the complex international legal regime of the U.N. 
                                                        
95 (Note: Also COLREGS 1972 Rule 2.) 
96 GUARDCON, BIMCO Website, https://www.bimco.org/Chartering/Documents/Security/GUARDCON.aspx (Accessed: 24 
August 2014). 
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Firearms Protocol,
 98
 a binding agreement entered into force in 2005, currently signed by 109 
States parties plus the European Union to ensure port and transit state permits if necessary.  
The UN suggests not only seeking pre-embarkation permission from the Flag State but also all 
countries through which PCASP will transit. This includes port and coastal states through 
which PCASP will embark, transport, carry, store, and disembark with (or without) security 
related equipment including and especially weapons to ensure they are in compliance with 
import/export laws for controlled items. 
The Protocol sets the regulations for firearms transport. PCASP must be careful and take the 
necessary precautions to ensure their carriage of weapons systems is rightly permitted and does 
not qualify as illicit trafficking. 
“Illicit trafficking” shall mean the import, export, acquisition, sale, 
delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components and 
ammunition from or across the territory of one State Party to that of 
another State Party if any one of the States Parties concerned does not 
authorize it in accordance with the terms of this Protocol”
99
 
The Protocol, however, prescribes the possibility for establishing a simplified system for 
temporary import and exports between States Parties, as follows. 
“States Parties may adopt simplified procedures for the temporary import 
and export and the transit of firearms, their parts and components and 
ammunition for verifiable lawful purposes such as hunting, sport shooting, 




Some states have taken advantage of this clause to establish systems for transiting PCASP and 
VPDs. Spain, for example, has made an agreement with the Seychelles to allow simplified 
transit procedures for its VPDs to board Spanish flagged fishing vessels in the Seychelles. 
                                                        
98 United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol), Signed on 11 July 2001 in New York. Entered into Force on 5 
July 2004, Article 3, e. 
99 ibid. 
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However, it remains uncertain which States in question qualify as State’s Parties due to the 
numerous states with often overlapping, concurrent jurisdiction in the case of PCASP 
operations described above- the flag state of the vessel, the coastal state/port state, the home 
state of the individual PCASP team member, the origin/destination state of the firearms, or the 
registration country of the private security company, if any. 
Floating armories have emerged as offshore supply stores delivering weapons and crews to 
client vessels, circumventing port and coastal state regulations, bypassing a need for 
import/export compliance.
101
 Of course, this has opened a pandora’s box in terms of un-
accounted for firearms, oversight, and regulation in and of itself. In other circumstances, 
PCASP have jettisoned weapons into the sea after completing missions in order to side-step 
such import/export regulations at their next port of call/disembark point.
102
 
Thus, gaps remain in the regulation and practice of weapons acquisition, transfer, storage, and 
use. Oversight mechanisms as well as import/export controls can be tightened to limit 
transgressions, prevent wrongful use, and avoid issues such as disappearances or firearms 
falling into the wrong hands.
103
 
3.2.4. Principle of Self Defense 
Of chief importance to the legal reasoning behind private use of force at sea in counter-piracy 
is the principle of Self Defense. According to the International Group of P&I Clubs: 
“Customary international law, among other legal authorities, provides that the 
use of force is restricted to cases of necessity or self-defence, i.e. cases in which 
there is no other way out and in which the requirements of necessity, 
reasonableness and proportionality are observed in connection with the use of 
force. Such customary international law is binding […] The use of force by 
private security guards must therefore be based on the general, internationally 
accepted principles of self-defence.”
104
 
                                                        
101 SEACURUS, “Tackling the Floating Armouries Issue,” Insurance Bulletin, Issue 19, October 2012, pp. 2-4. 
102 Puri, H.S., Letter dated 11 July 2012 from the Chair of the UN Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 
(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the UN Security Council, p. 278. 
103 ibid., p. 279. 
104  International Group of P&I Clubs, “Provisional guidelines – use of armed guards on board Norwegian ships,” 01 July 
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This has been reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Oil Platforms case, 
which stated that Iran had the right to protect its offshore installations against threats to their 
maritime and offshore infrastructure.
105
 
Moreover, individual guards, or any persons aboard a vessel for that matter, have the right to 
self defense of their person. This is a fundamental human right. If pirates or other attackers are 
are directing weapons fire in their direction, for example, and they believe their own life to be 
in grave danger, the same right of self defense for vessels applies at the personal level, just like 
on land, granting them, or any other individuals under threat, the ability to take a proportionate 
response to mitigate the treat.
106
 
3.2.5. Doctrine of Necessity 
After being discussed for decades in international law circles, the Doctrine of Necessity was 
finally incorporated into the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
 107
 
Article 25 of this document provides that an otherwise illegal act, such as using force to 
neutralize a terroristic or piratical attack at sea, can be justified if it meets two criteria:
108
 
1.The act was the only means of safeguarding an essential 
interest of the state against a grave and imminent peril 
2.The act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the 
state toward which the obligation existed. 
Interestingly, identical text as the above appeared in a predecessor article Article 33 of the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
109
 which was referenced with approval by the ICJ in the 
Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros case
110
 and by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the 
M/V SAIGA (Number 2) Case. 
111, 112
 
                                                        
105 ICJ, Case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) Summary of the Judgment of 6 
November 2003, paras. 75-77. 
106 Personal interviews with industry practitioners, May 2014. 
107 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 
108 ibid., Article 25. 
109 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Article 33. 
110 ICJ, Gabikovo (Hungary v. Slovakia), 1997, pp. 5, 40-41. 
111 ITLOS, The M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2) Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), 1999, para. 133. 
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Critics may argue that the above court uses of this doctrine both concern environmental 
security. However, it is not farfetched to believe that using this doctrine to support 
interdiction/neutralization of terrorists or pirates before they attack a vessel could be a valid 
application.
113
 Such activities could be justified on the basis that the ramifications of such an 
attack would be severe, with imminent loss of life, and also possible irreversible damage to the 
environment (i.e. attack on a tanker or offshore drillship resulting in a possible oil spill).
114
 In 
such situations, minor interferences with navigation such as allowing PCASP to engage and 
disable an approaching vessel, or as a last resort neutralize attacking individuals, would be 
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4. Soft Law 
This section will evaluate the role of Soft Law and industry self-regulation in shaping rules for 
private security responses to maritime piracy and other unlawful offences at sea. 
Despite international regulation grounded in international law (i.e. UNCLOS) and a myriad of 
coastal, port, and flag state policies, major institutional gaps remain.
116
 From a governance 
perspective, many argue that that there is a need for new approaches and instruments to 
enhance regulation in maritime security activities, increase harmonization of rules, set 
standards, and ensure compliance and cite that the best way to implement this is in a soft-law 
formant. This stems from a widespread commercial perspective that it is better to create 
controls, even self imposed ones now, than to launch new regulations later that will bring the 
industry to screeching halt.  
Organizations play a crucial role in setting standards, advocating for and developing unified 
rules in their sector. Industry associations which PMSCs seek to join add credibility to their 
services have emerged. These organizations stipulate requirements for their members to adhere 
to some of the below presented guidelines or be certified to set standards, or their own 
standards. The three most prominent are the Security Association for the Maritime Industry 
(SAMI), the Independent Association of Maritime Security Professionals (IAMSP) Vetting 
Scheme, as well as membership of the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG). 
Industry groups such as these view development of and adherence to soft law as cushioning the 
effects of possible future hard law “crack-downs” on operations, perhaps even allowing their 
self-imposed guidelines to become the templates for future national or international 
regulations. Soft law can act as a suitable test-run to evaluate if regulations work before 
escalating to (soft or hard) treaties. Moreover, it is undisputed that soft law may be a basis for 
customary international law.  
Critics to this approach, such as “watch-dog” NGOs, press for even more stringent hard law 
policies, viewing voluntary, market developed soft law protocols and codes of conduct as a 
way for industry to sidestep or delay full force government regulation. 
                                                        





  © 2014  Simon O. Williams     
To close regulatory gaps and to develop some level of oversight and legitimacy, multiple 
voluntary industry-wide codes of conduct, certification schemes, and guidelines have cropped 
up. Actions have been taken through consortiums of public and private partners interested in 
setting standards and improving best practices in this often considered unwieldy industry.
117
  
These voluntary certification schemes and codes of conduct can be considered soft law. Soft 
law is composed of non-legally binding instruments; often used when there is uncertainty or 
ineffective hard law. Parties to soft-law may behave in ways they negotiate and voluntarily 
sign up to. In this case, their actions reflect the industry attempting to pre-empt government or 
international regulation, to make standardization less painful and set trends in order to shape 
the future hard legal requirements in their sector. 
What are advantages of soft law? It is low cost, involves fewer meetings, fewer procedures, 
less bureaucracy, and is an excellent way to provide guidelines, develop interests, and builds 
momentum, to evaluate effectiveness before rolling out a hard law package. The disadvantage 
of soft law is that it does not require compliance by states or parties who do not want to 
change, which ironically are often targets of the instrument. 
Even if the industry has historically not been a major supporter of armed guards, all elements 
of the maritime industry which have reluctantly accepted the role of PCASP sought a code of 
practice for the use of force and a clear oversight structure for the provision of security. The 
industry has established “self regulating” doctrines beyond the limited hard law frameworks 
described above. This means that company management sets or adopts international private 
standards for their organization to follow. Historically, (if the private military contractor 
industry in Afghanistan and Iraq can serve as a comparison) there is a “race to the bottom” as 
providers respond to competitive pricing in an unregulated environment, but industry standards 
have emerged to provide a minimum threshold for quality services. 
The reporting of incidents that are resolved without damage to the ship or injury to the crew is 
also effectively dis-incentivized, since the reporting PCASP may open themselves to lengthy 
investigation and review of certification and training. To complicate matters, confidentiality 
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agreements, where incidents cannot be reported to outside agencies are sometimes incorporated 
as a part of the PMSC contract with the shipping company.
118
 
4.1. IMO Circulars 
“Universal and uniformed” is the spirit of International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
regulation because vessels travel through all maritime zones, under the jurisdiction of multiple 
countries, have crew from various countries and therefore need to be held to relatively uniform 
standards. 
The IMO is the United Nations specialized agency for Maritime Affairs. It seeks to develop 
coordination and policy guidance between different policy areas and different uses of the sea. 
Amongst other issues ranging from marine environmental protection from vessels to arctic 
shipping safety, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the IMO has drafted resolutions and 
recommended guidelines for the employment of armed guards aboard ships.
119
 
The IMO is considered the setter of Generally Accepted International Rules and Standards 
(GAIRS). Even if a state is not a party to specific IMO conventions, but a member of the IMO, 
then UNCLOS policy of enforcing GAIRS applies because GAIRS come from not only 
treaties, laws, but also resolutions of the IMO, which has near universal membership.
120
 
According to a 2012 statement from the office of the EU High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs, Catherine Ashton: “the legal basis of arming cargo vessels needed to be looked 




While IMO has not, at the time of writing, issued any binding treaty or convention regarding 
the use of armed guards aboard merchant ships, the Organization has released guideline 
documents, in the form of IMO Circulars, which can be considered soft law (or even customary 
                                                        
118 Huggins and Walje, “The Challenges of Maritime Private Security Oversight,” Private Security Monitor, 2012, Available 
at:  http://www.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/52135-the-challenges-of-maritime-private-security-oversight.html (Accessed: 22 June 
2014). 
119 Kraska, “International and Comparative Regulation,” op. cit., p.226. 
120 (Note: According to the Vienna Convention, conventions cannot be enforced against non-members, but can evolve into 
customary international law, especially in the case of IMO, which has near universal membership.) 
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international law), advising flag states,
122
 port and coastal states,
123
 ship-owners, shipmasters, 
and ship operators,
124
 and even private maritime security companies
125
 on best practices and 




IMO, however, has stated that their guidelines do not address Rules of Engagement for VPDs 
as this is a “military concept outside the organization’s remit.”
127
 
IMO also makes specific reference to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Providers and Montreux Document as reference points for PCASP guidance. Although neither 
of these texts deal explicitly with PCASP activity in the maritime domain, specifically in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction, as they were designed with terrestrial operations in mind, they act 
as a solid affirmations that the principles for good-conduct, compliance, and accountability 
should apply to the maritime domain, as well, especially the rule of law and human right law. 
The IMO MSC has urged port and coastal states to decide and clarify their laws regarding 
embarkation, disembarkation and carriage of PCASP, their weapons, ammunition and other 
security-related equipment along with flag states to decide whether or not they will allow 
PCASP aboard their vessels, and if so under what conditions.
128
 
In addition, the IMO has released the syllabus for a model course for maritime security 
officers.
 129
 Although this is not a piece of legislation, it is noteworthy as it has made a positive 
effect on the industry.
 130
 PCASP are completing this instruction from maritime training 
providers offering it as qualifying standard, often in conjunction with Flag State approval, 
thereby increasing PCASP benchmark competency and uniform training to respond to attacks 
against commercial vessels. The training, however, is not internationally compulsory by law, 
                                                        
122 IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1406, “Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag States Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted 
Armed Security Personnel On Board Ships in the High Risk Area,” 16 September 2011; IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1444, “Interim 
Guidance for Flag States on Measures to Prevent and Mitigate Somalia-Based Piracy,” 25 May 2012. 
123 IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1408, “Interim Guidance to Port and Coastal States Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed 
Security Personnel On Board Ships in the High Risk Area, 12 October 2011. 
124 IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1405, “Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and Shipmasters on the Use of 
Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel On Board Ships in the High Risk Area,” 25 May 2012. 
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yet ship-owners, insurers, and PMSCs actively seek personnel who have completed this 
training and/or other standards.
131
 
Specifically, the IMO guidance makes some tactical recommendations. It approves the use of 
passive and non-lethal defensive measures, supporting implementation of dual-use products 
inter alia; water hoses, nets, long range acoustic devices, razor and electric wire in the fight 
against piracy. On use of firearms, IMO is not as supportive, indicating hazards of firearms 





The International Code of Conduct (ICoC) for private security service providers has been 
signed by 708 security companies,  states, and other groups, identifying a set of principles and 
process for security providers to support rule of law and human rights.
133
 Parties, however 
incur no binding legal obligations and simply acknowledge that the principles of the Code of 
Conduct should be reflected in their operations. Although an accountability and oversight 
measure is being discussed for the ICoC, it may be difficult to enforce the provisions of the 
Code in a complex maritime environment, as opposed to on land, where jurisdiction and 
political boundaries are more straight forward. 
ICoC seeks to populate the absence of universal, uniform standards for performance protocols 
and requirements of security contractors, thus enhancing the likelihood that PCASP will 




The code of conduct, like most, is not legally binding. It simply implies there are international 
best practice standards to govern behavior, especially in this sector, and seeks to codify them 
into a document for providers and procurers of security services to voluntarily pledge 
adherence to. 
Comparing this to the IMO, which has made many technical guidelines, while still non-
binding, that carry more weight that CoCs due to “official” nature of the organization and 
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subsequent acceptance of many IMO guidelines as soft law, due to near universal state 
members to IMO. 
4.3. Montreux Document 
The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for 
States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed 
Conflict grew out of international concern over the considered un-governed, or at least 
unwieldy activities of PCASP supporting land operations, mostly for the US Government in 
Iraq. 
The Montreux Document, designed highlights seventy-three guidelines, reaffirming 
international law, specifically international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law. It is signed by fifty states, plus the EU, OSCE, and NATO. It encourages states and 
organizations to enact legislation requiring the vetting of private security companies and to 
impose penalties including criminal prosecution for violations of law.
135
 
Although non-binding, the Montreux Document can be considered a code of practice, signed 
by states and organizations, alike, to abide by already existing international law, highlighted in 
the document, to ensure the ensure that their operations do not take place in a legal vacuum, 
devoid from accountability, no matter far away from home they may be.
136
 This certainly can 
be, and has been, applied to the maritime context as well. 
Moreover, just as the nationality principle applies to vessels anywhere they are in the world via 
flag state jurisdiction, the Montreux Document introduces other applications for the nationality 
principle in the private security context. It titles three new groups of states. “Contracting 
States” which are states that directly hire private security services.
137
 “Territorial States” being 
states on whose territory private security activities take place,
 138
 which can arguably include 
maritime territories and ports. And “Home States,” which are the states of nationality of the 
private security company or individual PCASP.
 139
 As a result of these distinctions, further 
concurrent, or overlapping jurisdiction can apply to the individuals and firms in question, 
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4.4. ISO/PAS 28007 
While the Montreux Document and the ICoC are great stepping stones to guide the industry 
and advise on the best practices to be taken by crew and PCASP, they do not provide a 
benchmark standard for compliance activities in the maritime context. Thus industry leaders 
and organizations sought to develop a superior standard for private maritime security 
companies to meet, and be held accountable to.
141
 After much deliberation in the main 
maritime security forums of the IMO’s MSC, BIMCO, the Security Association for the 
Maritime Industry (SAMI), and the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG), it was 
decided that the International Standard Organization would release a pilot certification 
program, titled ISO/PAS 28007 as the standard.
142
 ISO/PAS 28007 has emerged as the most 
thorough, pinnacle of compliance and best practice for private maritime security companies to 
follow and be certified to, indicating they are working at the highest possible standard. 
The International Standards Organization, which standardizes many quality assurance systems, 
especially in the maritime sector, volunteered to design and produce the standard. It is hoped 
that ISO/PAS 28007 will be considered by major Flag States as a foundation to incorporate 
into their oversight regulations and standards for PMSCs operating on their flagged vessels.
143
 
The standard has developed in two parts, as described below. 
4.4.1. ISO PAS 28007: Part 1 - Guidelines for Private Maritime security Companies 
(PMSC) providing privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board 
ships (and pro forma contract) 
Part 1 is a list of best practice recommendations, to which private maritime security companies 
should strive to follow, and then achieve ISO certification to, attesting to their industry 
leadership, legal compliance, and good conduct. Being certified to this standard the provides a 
clear frame reference to ship-owners and other possible clients, that the certified PMSC in 
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141 Noakes, Giles, Safety4Sea Interview at Posidonia 2014, “Giles Noakes, BIMCO Chief Maritime Security Officer, discusses 
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question, can be relied on and trusted to conduct operations in line with the highest industry 
standards and recommended best practices.
 144
 
According to the managing director of an industry leading PMSC, it is “inevitable […] that 
there will be significant variances in the quality, integrity and professionalism of the services 
being offered. Services can range […] from a highly professional, vetted, regulated and trained 
company, to an opportunistic start-up that chooses not to comply with any existing standard 




ISO/PAS 28007 sets a standard for private maritime security operations, and creates a common 
understanding amongst service providers, procurers, and all state authorities of the role PCASP 
play in maritime security. The certification to ISO/PAS 28007 is the only accepted 
international certification scheme that can allow any interested party to quickly and confidently 
ascertain the legitimacy, competence, and compliance of a PMSC. 
146
 
4.4.2. Part 2 - Guidelines for Private Maritime security Companies (PMSC) providing 
privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board ships- 
International Model Set of Maritime Rules for the Use of Force (RUF)- AKA- ‘The 100 
Series Rules’ 
On top of the issues of oversight and accountability, PCASP lack any standardized policy for 
the use of force.
 147
 Military service personnel follow strict Rules of Engagement (RoE); 
command directives on circumstances under which forces will enter into and continue combat 
against opposing forces.
148
  In the military context, these are generally consistent with 
international law and state practice, proportionate to the opposing forces and their use of force. 
In the private sector, specifically private maritime security industry, military guidelines are not 
applicable to civilian personnel, and the international laws governing threat response, such as 
the Geneva Conventions, do not apply, although the right to self defense is permitted, as 
discussed in section 3.2.4.  
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As a result, an industry effort emerged to clarify rules for self-defense at sea by private parties, 
shipowners, crews, ship masters, and PCASP, where a standardized, legal use of force policy 
did not earlier exist.
149
 To provide such order, an optional industry-wide guideline emerged, 
which if followed, can mitigate the possibility that lethal force is used inappropriately and 
disproportionately. This guideline, dubbed the “100 Series Rules” has been developed as a 
civilian Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) version of military Rules of Engagement (RoE) to be 
appended to the ISO/PAS 28007 guidelines.  
The 100 Series Rules provide an international model set of RUF to which PCASP can be 
professionally trained to follow and their actions measured and evaluated by competent 
authorities in the event of a use of force incident. According to barrister and The 100 Series 
Rules chief author, Mr. David Hammond of 9 Bedford Row International, “The point of this 
document is not one of imposition upon entities, but one of choice against which one can make 
an informed decision when reviewing and comparing RUF. At its core is the basic principle of 
the individual right of self-defence; itself a universal concept.”
150
 
Thus, Parts 1 and 2 of ISO/PAS 28007 together reaffirm international law and obligations, 
painting a holistic best practice standard to which the private maritime security industry can be 
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5. Conclusion 
Although maritime terrorism, armed robbery, and piracy remain plagues to the global maritime 
industry, the private sector has successfully responded to protect lives and secure commercial 
infrastructure on their own where government activity lacks. This response, outside of direct 
state management, often thought to be ungoverned, is actually regulated by existing 
international hard-law mechanisms and soft law in the form of industry introduced best 
practice guidelines. As this paper highlighted, the trend to fill regulatory gaps in this sector has 
been taken proactively by the industry itself, with numerous of codes of conduct and guidelines 
emerging to supplement hard law established in international conventions and state practice. 
There is always room for improvement and enhancements. Regulatory and oversight 
mechanisms will be tweaked in time and the system will continue to evolve, as it already has. 
Yet, the legal regime of the Law of the Sea, specifically that codified in UNCLOS, provides 
the basis for ocean governance, stipulating state responsibility, obligations, and jurisdiction. 
This foundation, especially the jurisdiction trifecta of flag, port, and coastal states, as well as 
the zonal structure established by UNCLOS is chief to ensuring uniform and universal oceans 
management in all industries, private maritime security certainly being no exception. It 
provides the necessary checks and balances, coupled with the redundancy of concurrent 
jurisdiction in certain circumstances, to maintain order over activities at sea. 
Soft law has emerged to augment these measures, being fostered within the industry as a less 
costly and more immediate tool for the sector to regulate itself. This has brought with it a fast 
professionalization of the industry, accepted by the greater maritime community, especially the 
IMO. Such growth reflects the global acceptance that private maritime security operations, 
which are now industry commonplace, are indeed regulated and checked via multiple channels. 
Challenges still remain in advocating for use of voluntary crisis reporting measures and 
standardizing the interplay between private security and insurance sectors to enhance 
transparency and business accountability. Yet there is no doubt that the efforts of private 
maritime security have made a substantial positive impact on the global shipping industry, as 
no vessel employing armed guards has fallen victim to piracy or armed robbery.
151
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The industry hopes to see this trend continue. Ensuring that the legal regime set down in hard 
law is respected, followed, and enforced, as well as encouraging industry leaders to adopt 
already existing soft law mechanisms will guarantee that trends toward increased legal 
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